SPRING BREAK IS NEARLY GONE

. . .and I haven't finished my reading yet. I will say a few things about Tucker and Hendrickson's Imperial Temptation, though:

• It is astounding how many of the same issues that GWI presented are being replayed in GWII; this is astounding because it seems like the media script that has been running draws a sharp distinction between the two, but Tucker and Hendrickson also present GWI as a "war of choice" and a "preventive war." Further, the WMD threat was more prominent in the discussions surrounding GWI than I remember, at least. In GWI, the focus was more clearly on nuclear weapons, however.


• Tucker and Hendrickson present GWI as providing a new orientation for the American public on the appropriateness of using military force abroad in situations that are neither clearly required by prudential considerations nor clearly in accord with international law. GWI was fought under the idea of a "new world order" in which American military might would protect the existing state system against threats from middle-level powers from the developing world that might use WMD's and terrorism to attain their ends.


• Quote from Bush, the elder: "no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving and no rewards for aggression." (Tucker and Hendrickson 39). According to T and H, this understanding of how to deal with preceived threats from countries like Iraq rests on a false understanding of power, one that "abjured the search for reasons that might account for aggressive behavior."


• American power is infused with a universal, moral significance, and the imperative to project American power abroad becomes overwhelming.

T and H see a "pathology" in one particular aspect of the approach that Bush the elder took, however: the idea that we should project an overwhelming amount of force where needed and then leave as soon as possible and let others pick up after us.

We have fastened upon a formula for going to war -- in which American casualties are minimized and protracted engagements are avoided -- that requires the massive use of American firepower and a speedy withdrawal from the scenes of destruction. [. . .] Its peculiar vice is that it enables us to go to war with far greater precipitancy than we otherwise might while simultaneously allowing us to walk away from the ruin we create without feeling a commensurate sense of responsibility. It creates an anarchy and calls it peace. In the name of order, it wreaks havoc. It allows us to assume an imperial role without discharging the classic duties of imperial rule.(162)

It remains to be seen whether or not Bush the younger is planning on altering this formula. The problem with Bush's promised alteration is that it looks too much like classical imperial policy, despite Bush's protestations to the contrary. And as I've continually said here, I really doubt that Bush is serious on this score, although I admit that stranger things have happened than my turning out to have been wrong.