TWO WMD-RELATED ARGUMENTS FOR WAR

Ran across this paragraph in a NYT op-ed written by Richard Perle, 12/28/2001:

With each passing day, [Saddam Hussein] comes closer to his dream of a nuclear arsenal. We know he has a clandestine program, spread over many hidden sites, to enrich Iraqi natural uranium to weapons grade. We know he has the designs and the technical staff to fabricate nuclear weapons once he obtains the material. And intelligence sources know he is in the market, with plenty of money, for both weapons material and components as well as finished nuclear weapons. How close is he? We do not know. Two years, three years, tomorrow even? We simply do not know, and any intelligence estimate that would cause us to relax would be about as useful as the ones that missed his nuclear program in the early 1990's or failed to predict the Indian nuclear test in 1998 or to gain even a hint of the Sept. 11 attack. (emphasis added)

There were two WMD-related cases for war and only one of them relies on intelligence estimates. First is the standard argument among folks who are worried about reigning in the possibilities of "preemption," and it goes like this: if we're going to have a declared policy of preemption, we need to have good intelligence. Otherwise, we will wage war in cases where the threat does not justify an invasion and incur emnity and mistrust.

Then there's the second case for war, outlined in Perle's argument above. I like the term "categorical" for this approach: any state that fits into the category of "rogue state" is a possible target for preemption, because the risk is too great that such states may possess WMDs and either use them or transfer them to terrorists. The case is "categorical" partly because it doesn't require additional information in order for war to be an option. A state goes in the "rogue" box and right away war is on the table, probably even preferable.

Folks who pushed the first argument want reliable intelligence estimates in order to be able to avoid invasions when they are not necessary. They should also be concerned about the process by which intelligence is communicated to the White House and then used in the service of policy.

Folks who pushed the second argument don't need neutral intelligence services at all. Whether Iraq actually has WMD's is, according to this argument, irrelevant; it's enough that Iraq was what it was, a state in the "rogue" category. Again, as Perle noted in December 2001, intelligence estimates may need to be ignored in order to see the larger, more dangerous picture. Note that this second argument implies a standing criticism of intelligence estimates: they will always be wrong if they distract from the bigger picture, so there will always be reasons to discount intelligence agencies and attempt to weaken -- or, perhaps, transcend -- their influence. This also means that criticisms of the intelligence agencies from the hard-line preemption crowd should be viewed as the intellectual equivalent of a yellow card: hold up the card when intelligence is spoken of, we know what the message is, duly noted.