Friday, April 23, 2004

TEXT OF BEST BAKERY OPINION

If you're interested in the full text of the Indian Supreme Court opinion by Justice Arijit Pasayat in the Best Bakery case, which arose out of the violence in Gujarat two years ago, you can go here (Supreme Court Online) or here (Judis). For some comments on the case, see the posts here and here at the blog Human Rights in India.

Here are a few striking passages in which Justice Pasayat deplores the atmosphere in the lower courts:

[35] A more serious ground which disturbs us in more ways then one is the alleged absence of congenial atmosphere for a fair and impartial trial. It is becoming a frequent phenomenon in our country that court proceedings are being disturbed by rude hoodlums and unruly crowd, jostling, jeering or cheering and disrupting the judicial hearing with menaces, noises and worse. This tendency of toughs and street roughs to violate the serenity of court is obstructive of the course of justice and must surely be stamped out. Likewise, the safety of the person of an accused or complaint is an essential condition of or participation in a trial and where that is put in peril by commotion, tumult or threat on account of pathological conditions prevalent in a particular venue, the request for a transfer may not be dismissed summarily. . . . Indeed, it is the duty of the court to assure propitious conditions which conduce to comparative tranquility at the trial. Turbulent conditions putting the accused's life in danger or creating chaos inside the court hall may jettison public justice. If this vice is peculiar to a particular place and is persistent the transfer of the case from that place may become necessary. Likewise, if there is general consternation of atmosphere of tension or raging masses of people in the entire region taking sides and polluting the climate, vitiating the necessary neutrality to hold detached judicial trial, the situation may be said to have deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant transfer. . . .

. . .Mob action may throw out of gear the wheels of the judicial process. Engineered fury may paralyse a party's ability to present his case or participate in the trial. If the justice system grinds to a held through physical maneuvers or sound and fury of the senseless populace the rule of law runs aground. Even the most hated human anathema has a right to be heard without the rage of ruffians or huff of toughs being turned against him to unnerve him as party or witness or advocate. Physical violence to a party, actual or, imminent, is reprehensible when he seeks justice before a tribunal. Manageable solutions must not sweep this Court off its feet into granting as easy transfer but uncontrollable or perilous deterioration will surely persuade us to shift the venue. It depends. The frequency of mobbing manoeuvres in court precincts is a had omen for social justice in its wider connotation.


On the subject of the communal violence as a whole, here is a striking passage:

[63] When the ghastly killings take place in the land of Mahatma Gandhi it raises a very pertinent question as to whether some people have become so bankrupt in their ideology that they have deviated from everything which was so dear to him. When large number of people including innocent and helpless children and women are killed in a diabolic manner it brings disgrace to the entire society. Criminals have no religion. No religion teachers violence and cruelty-based religion is no religion at all, but a mere cloak to usurp power by fanning ill feeling and playing on feelings aroused thereby. The golden thread passing through every religion is love and compassion. The fanatics who spread violence in the name of religion are worse than terrorist and more dangerous than an alien enemy. . . .

And one more on the way the cases were handled in Gujarat:
[65] If one even cursorily glances through the records of the case, one gets a feeling that the justice delivery system was being taken for a ride and literally allowed to be abused, misused and mutilated by subterfuge. The investigation appears to be perfunctory and anything but impartial without any definite object of finding out the truth and bringing to book those who were responsible for the crime. The public prosecutor appears to have acted more as a defence counsel than one whose duty was to present the truth before the Court. The Court in turn appeared to be a silent spectator, mute to the manipulations and preferred to be indifferent to sacrilege being committed to justice.