THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY, 21ST CENTURY EDITION

(Title with apologies to Brad DeLong.)

William at Southern Appeal points to an article by Paul Starobin in the Atlantic Monthly called "The Dawn of the Daddy State." Starobin writes:

[T]he necessary response to terrorism is not to limit the power of the state but, rather, to bolster it, so as to preserve the basic order without which the defenseless citizen has no prospect of enjoying the splendors of liberty. In the wake of Madrid, in the wake of 9/11, in the wake of suicide bombings in Moscow subway stations and Jerusalem cafés, the state is impelled to become even more intrusive and muscular than it already is. How well today's leaders meet this obligation to construct more-vigilant states is very likely to stand as one of history's most important criteria for assessing their stewardship.

An authoritarian push is often seen as coming from above, forced on an unsuspecting public by would-be autocrats. But today's global trend toward what might be called the Daddy State is propelled by the anxious demands of majority blocs of citizens. . . .

[W]e are at the dawn of a popularly sanctioned movement toward greater authoritarianism in the domain of what is now fashionably called "homeland security."

. . .

Life in a Daddy State global order promises to be a somewhat mixed affair. Life will be best for majority groups in well-fortified but not overly heavy-handed Daddy States. As ever, life will be rough for anyone under the boot-heel of an unconstrained autocrat. But perhaps the most terrible fate awaits those trapped in the primeval chaos, without any sort of state protection. That condition of extreme vulnerability is borne by, for instance, Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. And should state-building fail in Afghanistan and Iraq, their peoples, too, will inhabit this sort of limbo, in which, as Hobbes memorably wrote, "there is no place for Industry ... no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."

Starobin then evokes Hobbes for the proposition that security is the most important aim of the state.

William finds the article frightening:

This article gave me quite a jolt. The central state is more involved in our lives today than ever before. Yet, we see the intellectuals calling for more state power--calling for "authoritarianism." James Madison once observed that "it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to the provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad." Fear of foreign perils, Madison realized, can easily persuade a freedom-loving people to voluntarily part with liberties they would otherwise consider indispensable. In Thomas Jefferson's words, the people are "made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging chains for themselves."

For a contrary view, see this blogger.

In the context of the regime typology that he employs, Starobin probably gets the ordering right, at least for most people: if your only choices are constrained autocracies, unconstrained autocracies, or statelessness, the first is better than the second, and the second is better than the third. In good Hobbesian fashion, though, this description of available state forms narrows the horizon too quickly.

In addition, Starobin is not particularly interested (at least here) in the ways in which politicians can inflame and encourage popular fear of terrorists like al Qaeda in order to increase state power. We have seen this kind of argument before, at the beginning of the last century in the U.S., when anarchist bombings helped create a climate that produced harsher approaches to radical groups and political parties. But the popular demand for such approaches should not be overstated. First, most law enforcement took place at a local level, so individual citizens probably felt that they had a stronger hand in participating in collective efforts at security. This also could provide a certain kind of check on police power, if one that was highly contingent on circumstance and organization, as the quote from Richard Frost's The Mooney Case below shows. Not sure about how widespread such checks were, but it is worth thinking about at least, especially if you are interested in the possibilities of popular checks on increased state authority.

Second, popular fear does not exist as such, any more than popular demands for particular kinds of legislation. Popular fears can be shaped by various forces, including (and perhaps especially) the news and entertainment media. Think of William Randolph Hearst. And popular demands are mediated through the activities of organized interest groups. Think of the role of the Native Sons of the Golden West in pushing for Japanese internment (see here, for example).