One proposal that has been floated in Republican ranks to counter Democratic filibusters of Bush's judicial nominees is challenging the constitutionality of the filibuster in court, according to
this article on the
WaPo web site (via
Election Law). Rick Hasen thinks that the constitutionality of a filibuster of judicial nominees is a political question that courts should stay away from (his analysis goes deeper than that, though; go read his post; also read Lawrence Solum's take
here).
The merits of the case aside, the hypocrisy involved in such a suit would be staggering: Republicans have gotten involved in the nominations fight with Democrats because of a professed belief that courts have been too powerful and activist in the first place. One should put this question to the Senate Republican caucus: Is the political question doctrine now itself a heritage of judicial activism (namely, activism with respect to powers of judicial self-limitation)? A lawsuit would show that the Republicans want to have their cake and eat it, too, by attacking judicial power when it suits them, but also calling upon that power when it suits them. Some have said that Bush v. Gore shows how uncommitted Republicans really are to judicial self-limitation. It would be much harder to counter such a claim if Republicans now sued over something that is arguably a matter of the Senate's constitutional power over its own proceedings.
Republicans may not go forward with such a suit, but even if they don't, I think the issue points to a broader question with respect to Republican attacks on the judiciary. People go to court for a variety of reasons in a variety of politically charged circumstances. As the saying goes, "garbage in, garbage out." To expect the courts to depoliticize all issues is naive. There are certain constitutional reasons that some judges might find persuasive with respect to a challenge of nominations filibusters. Perhaps it would be very hard for judges to completely exclude their political preferences here. Perhaps it would also be hard for judges to exclude their institutional identity as well, given the fact that the nominations question is intimately bound up with questions of the nature of the judiciary. I get the impression that legal actors in particular are uncomfortable with the possible damaging effects of an increasingly politicized nominations process, for, as Lawrence Solum argues so passionately and intently, all of the following seem to be at stake: the independence of judges, the legitimacy of judicial review, and public attachment to the rule of law.
So, as Solum says, "who knows what Courts might do these days?" Is this uncertainty a matter of judicial corruption? I'm not so sure. In fact, it seems to me to be partly the result of what political actors expect the courts to be doing. On a more mundane level, those political actors are the same actors, for example, who write environmental statutes that allow the Army Corps of Engineers discretion to issue wetlands constructions permits and give judges jurisdiction to review the applications (mostly because Congress doesn't want to have to make these kinds of decisions on their own; they want to delegate the uncomfortable responsibility to other bodies, including courts).
I don't think that Solum would disagree with my statements; in fact, it is probably his concern that judges retain enough legitimacy so that they can make unpopular decisions when necessary. But I think that it's important to note that much of what the contemporary Republican party is calling "activism" is a result of Congress's own attempts to get courts to perform functions that members of Congress, themselves, don't want to take the political heat for. Land use provides some excellent examples, as I noted above.
An analogy with the threatened nominations filibuster case is imperfect but nonetheless apt. Such a suit would be a politicization in a slightly different direction, namely, the attempt to use the courts to put political pressure on an opposition that is using tactics which are frustrating but arguably allowed by Senate custom, practice, rules, and constitutional text. Republicans might want to roll the dice at the judicial crap shoot table even though their legal advisors will tell them that a suit is unlikely to succeed. They may also wish to initiate a suit for the headline effect: "Senators Challenge Constitutionality of the Filibuster" or "Senators Seek to Counter Obstructionist Democrats" or something like that. My experience teaching separation of powers cases tells me that the political questions doctrine in such cases is not palatable to most of my students. Imagine the headlines in the conservative press when the Republicans lose: "Judges Throw out Suit (subtext: on Some Silly Narrow Ground that Shows How Corrupt They Really Are)."
So, my recommendation: Republicans, heal yourselves.
MORE: See also the analysis at the Daily Kos here.