Over the weekend, Habermas and Derrida published an essay that outlines their vision of a common European foreign policy. Excerpts from the letter are available in German
here. Read my post
here, and an article
here (link via
political theory daily review) Read Josh Cherniss's perceptive post
here (which I'll have something to say about later).
Finding no translations of this essay, I made one myself, at least of the portions already available on the web. It's rough, and I'm open to corrections. I'll omit the usual italics. Ellipses mirror the original selection. Here it is (hope this isn't illegal):
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AFTER THE WAR: THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE. Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Excerpts published online May 31, 2003, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
We should not forget two dates: the day on which newspapers informed their readers of that staggering expression of loyalty to Bush to which the Spanish prime minister invited those European governments who were willing to go to war – invited behind the backs of their other EU colleagues; and the 15th of February 2003, the day on which the demonstrating masses in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris reacted to this surprise attack. The simultaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations – the largest since the end of the second World War – could appear in retrospect, in the history books, as a signal for the birth of a European public [Oeffentlichkeit].
During the heavy months before the beginning of war in Iraq, a morally obscene division of labor spewed forth [OK, this is odd, but, hey, it's a first draft!]. The massive logistical operation produced by the unstoppable military advance and the hectic work of the humanitarian aid organizations fit together, precisely, like the teeth of a cog. The events unfolded also before the eyes of the population that would, robbed of any ability to respond, become their casualty. There is no doubt: the power of feelings brought Europe’s citizens to their feet. At the same time, however, the war showed the Europeans that their common foreign policy had begun to fail long ago. As in the rest of the world, the casual violation of international law ignited in Europe a dispute over the future of the international order. But the divergent arguments cut us deeper.
. . .
The [European] constitution will present us with a European foreign minister. But what good is a new office as long as the [European] governments can’t unite around a common policy? Even if Fischer has a new position he will still be as powerless as Solana. In the meantime, only the core states of Europe are prepared to give the EU properties that make up a state. What should be done when only these same countries are able to agree on a common definition of “their own interests”? If Europe is to avoid falling apart, these countries must use the mechanisms of “strengthened cooperation” that were decided upon in Nizza [read: Nice (thanks, Willem!)], to begin fashioning, in a “Europe with different speeds,” a common foreign policy, a common security policy, and a common defense policy.
If that happens, there will be a centrifugal [should read, "centripetal'*] force that the other member states won’t be able to resist in the long run – at least those states in the Euro-zone [i.e. that use the Euro as common currency]. In the context of the future European constitution, separatism should not, must not exist. But proceeding in this context does not mean “excluding.” The core Europe of the avant-garde must not harden into a “little Europe” [Kleineuropa]; it must, as it has often done, be the locomotive.
. . .
It won’t pay, in this world, for politics to deal exclusively in the silly and costly alternatives of war and peace. Europe must apply pressure in the international arena and in the context of the UN, in order to provide balance to the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States. At world economic conferences, in the World Bank and the IMF, Europe should use its influence to bring about the formation of a future “world domestic policy” [Weltinnenpolitik].
. . .
Are there common historical experiences, traditions, and achievements, that can help create the consciousness of a political fate [Schicksal] that will be felt by all and formed by all? An attractive – even infectious – “vision” of a future Europe will not fall from heaven. Today such a vision can only be born of the unsettling experience of helplessness. But it can also result from the [inner] distress caused by the current situation, in which we Europeans are thrown back on ourselves. And it must be articulated in the wild cacaphony of a public with many voices. If up to now this topic has not made it on to the agenda, we intellectuals have failed.
It is easy to agree on things that have no binding force. All of us imagine a peaceful, cooperative Europe that is open to other cultures and capable of dialogue. We remind ourselves [begruessen – literally, greet] that in the second half of the 20th century, Europe has found prototypical solutions for two problems. The EU presents itself as a form of “governing beyond the national state,” that could serve as an example as a post-national constellation. For a long time the European welfare state was also an example for others. At the level of the national state, however, it has been forced into the defensive. But the level of social justice that the welfare state has attained should not be abandoned in any future politics of the taming of capitalism. Why shouldn’t a Europe that has solved such enormous problems also take on the challenge of developing and defending a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law?
. . .
Today we know that many political traditions that claim authority by virtue of being natural, in reality are “discovered.” In contrast to those, a European identity born in under public scrutiny would appear constructed from the very start. But only that which is constructed by arbitrary will [Willkuer] is flawed by virtue of being arbitrary [Beliebigkeit]. A political-ethical will that operates through the hermeneutics of the processes of self-understanding is not an arbitrary will. The difference between those inheritances that we accept and those we reject requires as much prudence [Umsicht, also circumspection] as the decision regarding the variations in how we take on our inheritance. Historical experiences require a conscious appropriation if they are to have identity-creating power.
. . .
In Europe, the class differences that have had such long-term effects have been experienced by those subject to them as a fate that could only be dealt with through collective action. Thus, in the context of the workers movements and the Christian-social traditions, a solidaristic ethos that seeks equal care for all as well as the fight for more “social justice” has won out over an individualistic ethic of the justice of individual achievement [Leistungsgerechtigkeit] that accepts crass social inequalities.
Europe today is characterized by the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and by the experience of the Holocaust – the persecution and annihilation of the European Jews, in which the National Socialist regime also involved countries that it had conquered. The self-critical confrontation with this past reminded us of the moral foundations of politics. A heightened sensitivity for injuries to personal and bodily integrity finds expression, among other things, in the fact that the European council and the EU require applicant states to renounce the death penalty.
A bellicose past involved all European nations in bloody confrontations at one point or another. From the experiences of military and spiritual mobilization against each other, they drew the conclusion that they should develop new, supranational forms of cooperation. The history of success with respect to the European Union solidified the conviction among Europeans that the domestication of state power requires a mutual restriction of spheres of sovereignty also on the global level.
Each of the large European nations experienced the flowering of imperial power, and – more importantly for our context – they also had to work through the experience of losing empires. This experience of decline was combined in many cases with the loss of colonies. As imperial power and colonial history recede into the past, the European powers have been able to adopt a stance of reflective distance to themselves. Thus they could learn to perceive themselves, through the eyes of the conquered, in the doubtful role of conquerors who are being called to account for the violence of a forced, deracinating modernization. That could promote the rejection of eurocentrism, and perhaps it has given wings to a kantian hope for a world domestic policy.
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*NOTE: I blew the translation here, sorry. The German is "Sogwirkung," which means centripetal. Sorry about that.
