PROMISES, PROMISES

Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Russell, describing the U.S. Army's relationship to Iraqi civilians in Tikrit:

What we've tried to is be honest with them. We don't promise them anything that we can't give them. We don't tell them anything that we know is false. I think over time this has built a trust, where we say, if we're going to do something or if we are going to deliver something, then we do. (from NPR's Morning Edition today, here)

Title of new book by Richard Perle and David Frum proposing super-duper, all-encompassing anti-terrorism policies:

An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror

Admittedly, I'm judging a book by its title, but this title is a real whopper.

The charitable version: Perle and Frum should fire their publicist and editor (if they're responsible for the book's title). The uncharitable version: our leaders (or leaders-wannabe) in the U.S. aren't being as straight with us as our army tries to be with Iraqi civilians. Not good.

There will be no "end to evil." Anyone who even hints at such an end is really talking about the End Times, when the Lord returns to earth in a triumphant, all-humanity-transcending blaze of power and glory. But only prophets and angels may confidently make such predictions. Perle and Frum are neither.

There will not be "victory" in the "war on terrorism" any more than there will be victory in the "war on crime." We may smash al-Qaeda, to be sure, but -- without apologies to President Bush -- "make no mistake": that will not represent a victory in the war on terrorism any more than incarcerating your neighborhood cocaine kingpin (or queenpin) would represent victory as such in the war on crime in your neighborhood. Perle and Frum are being irresponsible here and they should know it.

I hope at least that the book is better than the title. I'll form my judgment on this question when I find a copy of the book in a used book store somewhere.

Since on the All Things Considered story linked above, David Frum argued that it was absolutely essential that Bush get reelected in order for the plans in the book to be carried out, I'm left wondering whether the title is as unintentionally stupid as it sounds.

MORE: Not saying that smashing al-Qaeda wouldn't be good. Just saying that it won't constitute "winning" the "war on terror." There's a yawning, cavernously important difference here: so important that you could fall into it and still be falling when you wake up in the morning, after falling all night and even the night before.

REDISTRICTING

See Rick Hasen, arguing that the Supreme Court "might take the Texas [redistricting] case seriously," here. For a (relatively non-partisan) view in support of the decision, read Steven at Poliblogger, here.

Over dinner last night, Thomas Nephew and I discussed one of the possible positive results of the current redistricting imbroglios: more jobs for people with the technical skills necessary to draw congressional district maps. A niche market, to be sure, but it might be growing. . .

MZOUDI

Thomas at Newsrack Blog is back after a brief hiatus and has a lot of interesting posts, including this one on Abdelghani Mzoudi, a Qaeda member who appears to be catching a break from American reluctance to share intelligence with German authorities.

WAMPUM ON OLIPHANT

Read Oliphant (the other one) for Bloggies.

TOM SCHALLER ON DELEGATE SELECTION

In case you missed it: read Tom Schaller's detailed piece on delegate selection this primary season (with a focus on Maryland), here. The basic point is that Marylanders aren't likely to affect the primary outcome very much.

TWO POSTS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

On Chirac's pre-Christmas speech proposing to ban outward signs of religious faith in french classrooms, see Kerim at Keywords, here, and Scott Martens at Fistful of Euros, here. Kerim notes rightly that historically constitutional rights to religious freedom have served to protect religion in the U.S.; an aggressive public secularism has been less firmly rooted in American constitutional principles than it has been in France, beginning with some of the radical strains of the French Revolution and continuing after 1905 (something I learned from Alfred Grosser; see the reference in the post below). Nonetheless, I think that this difference, while real, can be overstated, for two reasons.

First, one can overstate the extent to which U.S. constitutional principles have in fact protected religion as such rather than majority religions (and protestant christianity in particular). Consider, for example, the Blaine Amendments (recently more interesting because of the red-hot religious scholarship case of Locke v. Davey, see here) and the history of suppression of mormons (see here). Protection of "religion" has often meant protection of protestantism and active suppression of other religions, for a variety of reasons including the presumed incompatibility of some religions with the virtues of American republicanism.

But secondly, one can overstate the extent to which public secularism is not a part of American constitutional approaches to religion. I still think that the post-WWII and pre-Rehnquist Court approaches to first amendment religious freedoms have some virtues. A thumb on the scale in favor of separation might be a sensible approach under conditions of religious pluralism, when combined with a consciousness of the history of oppression of minority religions. As Martens shows, however, the current French approach to public secularism can be read as a thinly veiled attack on muslims, or, at the very least, the potentially oppressive expression of French cultural anxieties concerning immigrant populations.

So it's a tough call. On the one hand, I don't think that the kind of shock expressed by Professor Bainbridge at the continued history of the Blaine amendments is particularly helpful, since the relevant question, to my mind, is the extent to which members of minority religions are being oppressed. Members of large, politically strong religions can take care of themselves; in fact, that's one of the reasons why we're getting cases such as Locke v. Davey. On the other hand, the use of public power to exclude religions will likely be used disproportionately against minority religions, which is bad.

At any rate, read both posts. Martens is particularly interesting on Belgium, and he gives one more reason to think that Canadians have navigated religious freedoms in a sensible fashion -- they accomodated Sikhs in the RCMP by creating an RCMP turban. Cool. Good work, folks.

ALFRED GROSSER

Thought I'd share a passage from Alfred Grosser's Vernunft und Gewalt: Die Französische Revolution und das deutsche Grundgesetz heute (Reason and Power [or Violence]: The French Revolution and the German Basic Law Today), Munich, 1989. The translation is mine.

On November 11th, 1793, in the former (and future) cathedral Notre Dame de Paris, the Fête de la Raison, the Festival of Reason, was performed, the high priest of which appears to have been Robespierre. On the 21st, he objected to dechristianization and atheism. On June 8th, 1794, the Fête de l'Etre Suprême, the Festival of the Supreme Being, occured, occasioned by Robespierre and under his direction. Return to a religion without a church, which -- in the manner of Voltaire -- needs a god, demanded and proven by reason, as a principle of explanation for the world and as a ground for morality? Or the mere traditional need to be able to persuade the people to obey and be moral, in the name of a principle that transcends and rules over human beings, while, at the same time, the ability to be directed by pure reason is reserved for those who are educated enough to have advanced toward reason itself? At any rate, the short time span between the two festivals indicates a tension that the Revolution is not alone in experiencing: Freedom of the mind (des Geistes) is not easily compatible with the content of religious belief, but it is nonetheless easier to derive ethics from belief, than it is to found ethics using reason alone. (71-2)

AFGHAN SUPREME COURT

A few things about the design of new Afghan Supreme Court are worth noting. I'm using the draft constitution available here (pdf file); not sure if there have been any changes in these aspects of the draft, however.

First, the Justices serve limited terms (ten years, no repeats); they must be at least 40 years old; they are nominated by the President and approved by one of the bodies of the legislature (the Wolesi Jirga, sort of like the House of Representatives), but the President has sole authority to pick the Chief Justice. Thus, partisan entrenchment over the long term will be relatively difficult to obtain but possible over the short term, depending on what norms develop for approval in the Wolesi Jirga (looks like simple majority vote, if I'm not mistaken). The limits on Supreme Court terms put the Afghan Supreme Court well within world norms; the terms are shorter than in the U.S. (life) but longer than is typical in India (only a few years). Generally, as I've noted before (see, for example, here), it seems to me that such limits are a good idea.

The Wolesi Jirga can impeach Supreme Court Justices by a 2/3 vote, after 1/3 agree to put the impeachment vote on the agenda, but the impeachment procedure is a matter of statute rather than constitutional law (see Article 127). This could mean a Court on a shorter leash than in the U.S. and reminds me of Philippine procedures.

But the Supreme Court is compensated, so to speak, for its relative institutional weakness, by being made very powerful in matters of lower court administration. Article 132 reads:

Judges are appointed at the recommendation of the Supreme Court and approval of the President.
The appointment, transfer, promotion, punishment, and proposal for retirement of the judges are within the authority of the Supreme Court in accordance with law.
The Supreme Court shall in order to improve the administrative and judicial affairs establish the General Administration Office of the Judiciary.

And Article 133 reads:

Whenever a judge is accused of having committed a crime, the Supreme Court shall investigate the case involving the judge in accordance with law.
After hearing his defense, if the Supreme Court regards the accusation to be valid, it shall propose the dismissal of the judges to the President.
Subject to Presidential approval, the accused judge shall be dismissed from duty, and punished in accordance with the provisions of law.

Thus, the Supreme Court has significant oversight functions with regard to the judiciary as a whole; the appointment power is likely to be especially important here. Is the idea to insulate lower judges from political considerations by making them accountable to (hopefully) relatively non-partisan Supreme Court members? Interesting.

ANOTHER INDIAN SUPREME COURT ROUNDUP

See the Business Standard, here, which argues that the Indian Supreme Court "lived up to the claim that it is the most powerful court under any democratic Constitution."

NZ SUPREME COURT "UP AND RUNNING". . .

See here. Amid complaints over the thin majority in favor of such a momentous step, the New Zealand parliament passed legislation last year creating the Supreme Court and making it, rather than the Privy Council in London, the highest court of appeals for New Zealanders. Most commonwealth countries have already abolished appeals to the Privy Council.

For some commentary, see here, here, here and here. The basic lines of the debate were whether the establishment of the Supreme Court would represent a step in New Zealand's national political development or the loss of an impartial avenue of appeal for NZ citizens. The Head Heeb, for example, writes:

Still, there's room to wonder whether something is being lost through the abolition of Privy Council appeals. Privy Council jurisdiction meant that New Zealanders could, if necessary, take their case to a court composed of judges from throughout the Commonwealth that sat thousands of miles from Auckland, far removed from local prejudices and political influence. As an equivalent, imagine if nine Canadian, British and Australian judges had been called in to hear Bush v. Gore. The Privy Council provides a perspective that a purely domestic court - in any country - might lack. (emphasis added)

On the other side, see this press release from the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (in favor of abolishment), this press release from Keith Locke, a Green Party MP (also in favor of abolishment), and this press release from the Maxim Institute, a conservative think tank (against abolishment).

THANKS

Thanks to Locus Solus, the Ciceronian Review, and the Mad Prophet Blog for the links. A diverse lot; makes me happy. Via Locus Solus, I've also discovered the witty, well-named and informative Fistful of Euros and Southern Exposure. Thanks, folks, for being generous enough to put your ideas out there!

AND WHILE I'M AT IT: both Ideal Rhombus and Southern Appeal (probably the first time they've ever been linked in the same post) have attractive new designs. It's a big tent here. Guarded by donkeys (mostly), to be sure, but still big.

BEN COMPAINE ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION

In this month's Reason, Ben Compaine attempts to counter the recent public concern with FCC rule changes that would allow for greater media concentration ("Domination Fantasies"). Compaine's article is an eloquent statement of the argument that the FCC's critics are misguided, but Compaine misleads on at least one crucial point.

He uses the low Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index score for the media industry as a whole (a measure used in antitrust contexts; Compaine made his own calculations) to argue against the view that the industry is concentrated in an inappropriate and dangerous fashion.

Compaine simplifies here, however. More fine-grained analyses are necessary. A HHI score for the industry as a whole (i.e., for the nation as a whole) would be interesting and important if the relevant market were the nation itself. As the FCC itself recognizes, however, geography still matters in the media industry. Smaller markets may be more vulnerable to concentration that drowns out politically significant alternative voices than larger markets.

But it's not only geographic markets that matter. Because the media is not like other consumer goods (diverse information is important for our common political life, not just for individiual utility-maximization), one needs to be concerned about such issues as unequal access to information. Compaine, evidently, is not. The rise of the internet often is used in such discussions as a sign that access to diverse views is assured throughout the country (or at least coming soon if the government would only let market forces reign supreme), but access to the internet itself is still uneven across socio-economic and racial categories.

MORE: the original version erred on the author's name; I've made the correction above.

WAS IST AUFKLAERUNG?

In preparation for the bicentennial of Immanuel Kant's death next month, Die Zeit has a series of essays from prominent intellectuals on Kant's most famous topic, "What is enlightenment?" Among the highlights: Bernard-Henri Lévy exposes several of what he calls the "illusions of enlightenment" and recommends a (chastened) revival of the idea of "critique" to counter those illusions. Francis Fukyama argues that modern science and technology seem to have made Kantian freedom impossible by withdrawing any scientific ground for a defense of the noumenal (or its analogue). Gianni Vattimo picks up on the structure of political authority in Kant's original essay and updates it with reference to modern mass media, two essays attempt an answer in dialogue with islamic traditions, and Karl Kardinal Lehmann, the Bishop of Mainz, turns the question into a call for a reinvigorated theology.