South Africa celebrates ten years of democracy with its third national elections tomorrow. The ANC is predicted to keep its hold on power (see here). For some key data on the elections, see here.
One of the important constitutional issues in the elections has been prisoners' voting rights. On March 3, the South African Constitutional Court ruled that a December 2003 law had unconstitutionally deprived some prisoners of their voting rights. See here and here. For the Court's ruling in the case, Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) and others, see the full text of the decision here (PDF file). The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Chaskalson and joined by seven other members of the Court, and Justices Madala and Ngcobo wrote separate opinions that dissent from most of the Court's holdings.
The opinions are complex, nuanced, and worth detailed study. The majority opinion's main argument is that the government has not provided enough justification for the exclusion -- the government relied primarily on cost considerations, but the provisions made for extending voting rights to other prisoners made such cost concerns unpersuasive in the eyes of the Court, or at least not persuasive enough given the significance of the rights at stake.
Both Justice Madala and Justice Ngcobo would countenance more restrictions on prisoners' voting rights than the rest of the Court. Like the Court majority, Justice Madala was not convinced by the government's argument that the costs and logistical difficulties involved in accomodating the prisoners in question justified the exclusion, but he argued that the majority had misunderstood the broader policy issues at stake:
The objectives of government in denying certain prisoners the right to vote are multi-pronged and must be treated holistically as an attempt by government to inculcate responsibility in a society which, for decades, suffered the ravages of apartheid; demeaning its citizens and creating irresponsible persons whose lives have become a protest. . . .
In my view, the temporary removal of the vote and its restoration upon the release of the prisoner is salutary to the development and inculcation of a caring and responsible society. Even if the prisoner loses the chance to vote by a day, that will cause him or her to remember the day he or she could not exercise his or her right because of being on the wrong side of the law. (53-54)
Justice Ngcobo writes:
In my view, the government has a legitimate purpose in pursuing a policy of denouncing crime and to promote a culture of the observance of civic duties and obligations.
. . .
[A] limited limitation of the right to vote sends an unmistakable message to the prisoner. If you should be released and again commit a crime of a nature that attracts the prison sentence without the option of a fine, you will not vote in the next elections. That message is a necessary effort to fight crime. It is a reminder that the duties and responsibilities of a citizen also include an obligation to respect the rights of others and comply with the law. The convicted prisoners break the law in breach of their constitutional duty not to do so. (64-65)
Justice Ngcobo, by the way, spent two years in the U.S. and was a law clerk for Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. on the Third Circuit. Ironically, perhaps, the dissenting opinions cite U.S. (and other countries') practices of prisoner exclusion as partial justifications for their positions.